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1. Introduction 
  A key objective of macroeconomic policy is to maintain economic stability.  Interest in the 
topic originated with Tinbergen (1952).  Employing a static linear framework he proved the now 
classic proposition stating that under certainty the policymaker need use only as many policy 
instruments as there are independent target variables in order to achieve any desired values for these 
target variables.
1  Extra policy variables are redundant, while with insufficient instruments not all 
objectives can be achieved simultaneously.  In practice, with the economy being inherently dynamic, 
it is clearly important to cast the theory of stabilization in a dynamic context, thereby enabling us to 
consider the stability of the economy as it evolves over time as well as in response to unforeseen 
stochastic disturbances that may occur at any point in time.
2 
  Few would dispute the proposition that Bill Phillips was a pioneer in the development of 
dynamic stabilization policy.  His contributions were manifest in two seemingly different, but as it 
turns out highly inter-related, areas.  The first, and more direct, contribution was contained in a pair 
of papers published in the Economic Journal in the 1950’s; Phillips (1954, 1957).  These papers 
draw upon his background as an engineer and are the first papers to apply feedback control methods 
to the stabilization of a macroeconomy.  Today that is a burgeoning field, and despite challenges 
stemming from the subsequent development of rational expectations, the application of control 
methods is now an integral part of the analysis of dynamic economic systems.
3   
  Like many fundamental contributions, Phillips’ initial contribution was simple.  Previously, 
Samuelson (1939) and Hicks (1950) had shown how, if one combines the multiplier in consumption 
with the accelerator in investment, one can derive a dynamic equation determining the evolution of 
                                                 
1 Brainard (1967) re-examined the Tinbergen proposition in a simple stochastic model and showed how it ceases to apply 
once multiplicative stochastic disturbances are introduced.  Henderson and Turnovsky (1972) showed how adjustment 
costs associated with policy instruments also leads to its break down.  
2 Preston (1974) referred to Tinbergen’s theorem as one of “static controllability” and using results from control 
engineering developed an analogous condition for the controllability of a linear dynamic system. 
3 There are in fact several societies and research outlets specifically focused on these types of issues.  In the late 1970s, 
the Society of Economic Dynamics and Control (now the Society of Economic Dynamics) and the Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control, were founded to foster the application of control methods to economics.  More recently, the 
Society for Computational Economics and journals such as the Review of Economic Dynamics,  Macroeconomic 
Dynamics, and Computational Economics have become established and are further testimony to the flourishing research 
activity in this general area. 
   2 
national income (output).  The precise nature of this relationship depends upon how the lags 
generating the dynamics are introduced and many ways to accomplish this exist.  The dynamics can 
be expressed in discrete time, as employed by Samuelson and Hicks, or in continuous time, as for 
example illustrated by Allen (1956) and used by Phillips himself.  Phillips took these simple 
aggregate models and showed how, if one introduces a government that instead of remaining passive 
follows some active policy intervention rule, then it will be able to influence the dynamic time path 
of the economy.  
  The second contribution relates to the celebrated Phillips curve (1958).  While this was 
originally proposed as an empirical relationship between (wage) inflation and unemployment and 
has spawned generations of empirical research, its introduction into the macroeconomic system turns 
out to have potentially profound consequences for the efficacy of stabilization policy. 
  Our objective in this essay is to review and evaluate the impact of Phillips’ seminal work of 
half a century ago on subsequent developments in macroeconomic stabilization policy.  We begin by 
first establishing the importance of stabilization policy in the development of economics, and in so 
doing underscore the significance of Phillips’ contributions.  We shall then discuss various issues in 
more detail.  Sections 3 and 4 briefly review the formulation of linear stabilization rules adopted by 
Phillips and show how these relate to the optimal stabilization rules that emerge from conventional 
linear-quadratic optimization problems.  These originated in the engineering literature, but turned out 
to be most convenient for the formal analysis of optimal stabilization policy.  Most of the early 
stabilization literature assumed fixed prices, or in any event was associated with “backward looking” 
or “sluggish” variables.  However, the development of rational expectations in the 1960’s and 1970’s 
posed a challenge for stabilization policy and this is discussed in Section 5.  This arose from the role 
of “forward-looking” inflationary expectations in the Phillips curve, and the effect this had in the 
design of optimal stabilization rules, through issues such as the “Lucas Critique” and the “time 
consistency” of policy. 
  Section 6 briefly comments on a long-standing debate, the merits of fixed policy rules versus 
discretionary or optimal policy.  Section 7 discusses some of the more contemporary aspects of 
stabilization policy and will serve to illustrate the durability of Phillips’ contributions.  The   3 
“expectations-augmented Phillips curve” and “New-classical Phillips curves” of the 1970s are now 
replaced by the “New-Keynesian Phillips Curve”.  The methods of optimal linear-quadratic 
stabilization theory of the 1970s is now applied as an approximation to more general utility 
functions.  In addition the linear feedback control rules initially proposed by Phillips have now been 
introduced into multi-agent dynamic games, while issues of learning are receiving increasing 
attention.. 
2.  The Significance of Stabilization Policy 
In the last 39 years, 11 of the Nobel prizes awarded in economics have been in the general 
area of macroeconomics.
4  Of these, four include the area of stabilization policy and contain this 
term or some close substitute in the citation.  The first of these was awarded to Milton Friedman in 
1976, with the citation stating: “for his achievement in the fields of consumption analysis, monetary 
history and theory and for his demonstration of the complexity of stabilization policy”.  In 1995 the 
prize was awarded to Robert Lucas “for having developed and applied the hypothesis of rational 
expectations, and hereby having transformed macroeconomic analysis and deepened our 
understanding of economic policy”.  The 2004 recipients, Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott were 
cited “for their contributions to dynamic macroeconomics: the time consistency of economic policy 
and the driving forces behind the business cycles”.  Most recently, the citation for the 2006 recipient, 
Edmund Phelps, included the statement “for his analysis of intertemporal tradeoffs in 
macroeconomic policy.”  The more detailed statement provided by the Sveriges Riksbank refers 
explicitly to the “so-called Phillips curve” and to the “expectations augmented Phillips curve”, in 
describing Phelps’ contribution. 
While the contributions for which these four prizes were awarded all extend beyond 
stabilization policy, particularly in the case of Friedman, who was in fact skeptical of active 
stabilization policy, they nevertheless share several common themes.  These include concepts such 
as “economic policy”, “Phillips curves”, “price expectations”, “macroeconomic dynamics”.  There 
                                                 
4 This is as categorized by Assar Lindbeck at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/articles/lindbeck/index.html.  
Jan Tinbergen, Paul Samuelson, and John Hicks, who were also early recipients and made important contributions in this 
area, were cited for more general contributions.   4 
are also substantive inter-relationships between the awards.  While Phelps developed a formal 
technical derivation of the expectations-augmented Phillips curve, Friedman provided an informal 
version in his 1968 American Economic Association presidential address.
5  This formulation is also 
closely related to the form of supply function that was central to Lucas’ work (the “Lucas supply 
function”).  In any event, it is evident that Bill Phillips’ insights are reflected in these contributions 
and that had it not been for his untimely death in 1975, he, himself, surely would have been an early 
recipient of a Nobel prize. 
3.  Phillips’ Policy Rules 
3.1  A simple textbook macrodynamic model 
  The Phillips analysis was based on the dynamic multiplier-accelerator model, previously 
developed by Samuelson (1939) and Hicks (1950).  There are numerous versions of this model and 
we shall introduce the simplest formulation employed by Phillips.  He expressed it using continuous 
time, which is more convenient for the purpose of establishing the implied dynamic behavior, but 
essentially the same conclusions can be reached using discrete time as did Samuelson and Hicks.
6   
  Aggregate demand of the economy at time t,  () Z t , is defined by 
    () () () () Z tC tI tG t =+ +       ( 1 )  
where  () Ct denotes consumption,  () I t  denotes investment, and  () Gt  denotes government 
expenditure.  Dynamics can be introduced in various ways.  Whereas Samuelson and Hicks did so by 
introducing lags into consumption and investment behavior, Phillips did so by assuming gradual 
product market clearance.  This is specified by 
    [ ] () () () 0 Yt Zt Yt αα =− >          ( 2 )  
                                                 
5 Friedman (1968), Phelps (1968). 
6 The contemporary literature on stabilization policy almost always employs discrete time; see e.g. Woodford (2003).  
Discrete time is in fact much more convenient for capturing some of the recent theoretical developments, which 
sometimes depend upon subtle issues of timing.  For example, the difference between the “New-Classical” and “New-
Keynesian” Phillips curve is one of timing, a difference that can be best captured using discrete time.  In our exposition 
we shallintroduce time in whichever way is more convenient.    5 
where ( ) Yt denotes aggregate supply at time t, and the dot denotes time derivative.  If aggregate 
demand exceeds output, supply is increased at a rate proportional to excess demand and vice versa.   
To complete the model, behavioral hypotheses must be introduced for consumption and 
investment.  The simplest of these is to specify that consumption is proportional to current output 
   () () Ct c Yt =      01 c < <      (3) 
and a constant rate of investment,  ( ) I tI = .  If, further, we assume that government spending is 
constant as well, then combining these equations we see that equilibrium output evolves in 
accordance with the simple equation, specifying the textbook dynamic multiplier model 
    [ ] () ( 1 ) () Yt c Yt I G α =− + +         ( 4 )  
  Phillips’ contribution was to introduce various policy rules for  ( ) Gt .  Much of this was 
developed and can be discussed in terms of this simple model.  However, most of the subsequent 
literature, as well as much of Phillips’ own contributions endogenized investment by employing 
some form of the accelerator theory.  The effect of this is to increase the order of the equilibrium 
dynamics, thereby generating a richer array of time paths for output and other relevant variables.  
For present purposes, the simpler model suffices.   
  Before discussing the policy rules introduced by Phillips, we should briefly observe the 
behavior of the economy implied by equation (4).  With I and G fixed, it is a linear first-order 
differential equation in Y, and provided 01 c < < , the evolution is stable and will converge 
monotonically to the stationary equilibrium level 








        ( 5 )  
This will be immediately recognized as being the equilibrium level of income in the simplest static 
linear macroeconomic model. 
3.2 Policy  rules 
  Within this framework, Phillips introduced government expenditure as an active policy   6 
variable that is continuously adjusted to meet certain specified objectives.  In doing so he 
emphasized the lags associated with adjusting the policy instrument itself.  These are often referred 
to as policy lags, and reflect delays in implementing decisions due to, for example, the political 
process.  They are quite distinct from lags from the underlying economic structure, such as those 
embodied in the market disequilibrium relationship (2), which may be appropriately characterized as 
being system lags.
7   
Phillips assumed that the policy actually implemented at any point in time adjusts only 
gradually to past policy decisions.  Thus, if G
d (t) is the desired value of the policy variable chosen 
at time t (the policy decision), the actual value of the policy variable, G(t), is adjusted in accordance 
with:
8 
    () ( () () )
d Gt G t Gt β =−    β > 0      ( 6 )  
The desired value of the policy variable, G
d (t), is related by some rule to the ultimate target 
objective that he took to be the stabilization of national income.  Phillips proposed three such policy 
rules, which he called: (i) proportional policy, (ii) integral policy, and (iii) derivative policy, all of 
which influenced the dynamics of the economy in different ways, having both desirable and 
undesirable effects on its evolution.  These terms did not originate with Phillips.  Rather, they were 
part of the tradition of classical control, where engineers referred to them as PID feedback rules.  We 
shall briefly discuss each in turn 
3.1.1 Proportional  policy 
  This was specified by Phillips to be 
   
* () ( )
d
p Gt YY γ =− −   0 p γ >        ( 7 a )  
where Y
* is the (desired) target level of output.  The parameter  p γ  represents the intensity of the 
                                                 
7 These two kinds of lags are also sometimes referred to as being “inside lags” and “outside lags”, respectively. 
8 Solving equation (6), the actual policy at time t is 
() () ()
t dt s Gt G se d s
β β
−−
−∞ = ∫ , which is seen to be an exponentially 
declining weighted average of past policy decisions.  As β →∞, the desired policy is fully implemented immediately.   7 
policy maker's desired policy response when output deviates from its target.  According to the rule 
specified in (7a), if 
* () Yt Y < , then  ( ) 0
d Gt > ;  if 
* () Yt Y > , then  ( ) 0
d Gt < .  Since the rule may 
require ( ) 0
d Gt < , Phillips interprets it as “net fiscal stimulus” rather than pure government 
spending, which by its nature is non-negative.  Thus (7a) asserts that the desired net fiscal stimulus is 
proportional, but opposite to, the deviation between current and desired level of output.  Combining 
equations (4), (6) and (7a), the dynamic evolution of the economy is described by the following pair 
of equations 







− ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
=+ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ −− ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠

      (8) 
Three observations about this system are worth noting.  First, the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for stability are: (i) 10 , ( i i ) 1 0 p cc γ βα −+ > −+ > so that it is clear that  , p γ β , which 
characterize the stabilization policy and implementation will influence the dynamics.  While (i) and 
(ii) will certainly be met if 01 c << , it may be possible to stabilize the system even in the 
implausible event where  1 c > .  Second, the eigenvalues to (8) will be complex if and only if 
[ ]
2
4( 1 ) p c αβγ β α >− − , implying that policy lags may induce cycles into the adjustment.  This is 
presumably undesirable, but hardly surprising, since with policies taking time to implement, by the 
time ( )
d Gt  is yielding its desired effect, the conditions leading to that decision may have changed, 
causing the system to over-adjust during the transition.
9 
Third, output in (8) converges to the stationary level 














       ( 9 )  
That is, in general, the level of output will fail to converge to its desired target level.  This was 
viewed by Phillips as being an undesirable feature of the proportional policy rule, but in fact it can 
be regarded as reflecting an inadequate specification of the rule, as given in (7a).  This formulation 
ignores the fact that given the behavior of the private sector as reflected by  , CI, the government 
                                                 
9 The policy parameters  , p βγ  also affect the speed of convergence.  While this was not an aspect that concerned 
Phillips, speeds of convergence have assumed an important role in contemporary macrodynamics, particularly in the 
dynamics of growth.   8 
must also choose an appropriate target level of expenditure, 
* G , if it wishes to attain 
* Y  in the long 
run.  This appropriate level is determined by the stationary relationship 
    
** (1 ) Gc Y I =− −  
Once this fact is recognized, it becomes natural to express (7a) in deviation form  
   
** () ( )
d
p Gt G YY γ −= − −       ( 7 a ’ )  
in which case the stability conditions remain unchanged, and if satisfied, ensure that output 
converges to its target, Y
*. 
3.1.2 Integral  policy 
  As an alternative policy, Phillips introduced the possibility that  ( )
d Gt  is determined by the 
integral (sum) of past deviations in output from its target, rather than only just the current deviation.  
This is specified by 
    
*
0 () [ () ]
t p
i Gt Y s Yd s γ =− − ∫   0 i γ >      ( 7 b )  
Differentiating with respect to t enables the policy to be written in the equivalent form 
    
* () [ () ]
p
i Gt Y t Y γ =− −       ( 7 b ’ )  
Expressed in this way, the rule asserts that the policy variable should be increased if output is above 
its target, and decreased otherwise.  It is the form of policy adjustment rule specified by Mundell 
(1962) and others in their analysis of the assignment problem, relating the appropriate adjustment of 
policy instruments to targets.   
  Combining, equations (4), (6), and (7b’) yields a system of three dynamic equations in Y(t), 
()
d Gt , and G(t): 













⎛⎞ − ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ =− + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟




    (10)   9 
This yields several differences from the proportional rule.  Assuming 01 c < < ,  
   [ ] (1 ) (1 ) i cc β αγ +− − >  
is a necessary and sufficient condition for (10) to be stable.  This indicates a tradeoff between the 
intensity of the stabilization policy and lags in policy for stability to prevail.  If the policy lags are 
sufficiently long (β  small), it is possible for overly intensive policy to generate instability.  Indeed, 
this was one of the concerns originally expressed by Friedman (1948).  In the absence of policy lags 
(β →∞) the integral policy will always ensure stability, although it may be associated with cyclical 
adjustment if the adjustment is too intensive (
2 4( 1 ) c γα >− .  In any event, if stable, Y will converge 
to 
* Y , thereby avoiding one of the undesirable features associated with Phillips’ specification of the 
proportionate rule. 
3.1.3 Derivative  Policy   
  The third policy rule introduced by Phillips, the derivative policy, is of the form 
     () ()
d
d Gt Y t γ =−     0 d γ >       ( 7 c )  
That is, fiscal stimulus depends upon the current rate of change of output, behaving like a “negative 
accelerator”.  For an appropriately chosen  d γ  this can stabilize an otherwise unstable system, 
although it will not succeed in driving income to its target level.   
  Phillips also proposed combining these three policy rules, by postulating e.g. 
  
** ( ) ( ( )) [ ( )] ( )
t d
pi d G t Yt Y Ys Y d s Yt γγ γ
−∞ =− − − − − ∫
      ( 1 1 )  
showing how by the judicious choice of weights  j γ  the policymaker can take advantage of the 
various desirable features of the individual policies, while reducing their unattractive aspects.  For 
example, the presence of the integral component ensures that income converges to its target, while at 
the same time undesired cyclical adjustments associated with this policy can be reduced with the 
simultaneous use of the proportional and derivative policies.  In this respect it is intriguing to 
observe that combining the policies as in (11) is a step in the direction of choosing the optimal  10  
stabilization policy.  Finally, we again emphasize that Phillips also introduced these policies into 
more complex models that include an accelerator determined investment demand, leading to higher 
order dynamic systems.   
While Phillips developed these rules in the context of fiscal stabilization policy, early 
applications of stabilization theory also applied them to monetary stabilization issues; see e.g. Lovell 
and Prescott (1968), Sargent (1971).  They also formed the basis for simulation studies involving 
both monetary and fiscal policies in larger macro models; see e.g. Cooper and Fischer (1974).  Most 
contemporary research on stabilization policy has focused on monetary policy, with the structure of 
fiscal policy being directed more toward longer-run issues pertaining to economic growth and capital 
accumulation.
10 
4. Linear-Quadratic  Optimal  Stabilization 
  The policy rules introduced by Phillips were postulated on the grounds of their plausibility.  
They are not in general optimal, although, as we shall see, they appear as components of an optimal 
policy. 
4.1 General  approach 
Beginning in the 1960’s, interest developed in the question of optimal stabilization policy.  
The framework employed to address this issue was the linear-quadratic system, an adaptation of the 
“state-regulator problem” developed by control engineers; see e.g Kalman (1960), Athans and Falb 
(1966), Bryson and Ho (1969).  In general, this can be outlined as follows. 
Consider an economy summarized by n state (target) variables, x, and m control (policy) 
variables, u.  Assume that the structure of the economy can be expressed by the linear vector system: 
     () () () () () x tA t x tB t u t =+        (12a) 
where ( ) At   is an n x n matrix and  ( ) B t  is an n x m matrix.
11  Assume further that the objective is to 
                                                 
10 For example, the “endogenous growth” literature pioneered by Romer (1986) and its extensions emphasizes the impact 
of tax rates and the role of public capital on growth.  There is much less focus on monetary policy. 
11 A system of an arbitrary order can always be reduced to a first order system by redefining the higher-order derivatives 
as new state variables, so in this respect (12a) is a general representation of a linear system.  11  




() () [( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ]
22
T
Jx T F x T x t M t x t u t N t u t d t ′′ ′ ≡+ + ∫     (12b) 
where F, ( ) M t  are positive semi-definite matrices,  ( ) Nt is positive definite, T is the planning 
horizon, and primes denote the vector transpose operator.   
In economic terms, the policymaker wishes to keep a set of target variables, and the 
corresponding values of the policy variables, as close as possible to their desired target values, with 
deviations from objectives being penalized by quadratic costs.  The optimal (cost-minimizing) value 
of the control vector,  ˆ() ut is a linear feedback rule of the form 
    
1 ˆ() () () () () ut N tB tPtxt
− ′ =−       ( 1 3 a )  
where ( ) Pt   is the unique positive semi-definite solution to the Riccati equation: 
   
1 () () () () () () () () () () () Pt Mt AtPt PtAt PtBtN tB tPt
− ′′ =− − − +   (13b) 
and satisfies the boundary condition 
     ( ) PT F =         ( 1 3 c )  
The critical thing to note about this solution is that the optimal policy is a time varying linear 
feedback control law, in which, in general, all of the control variables are linear functions of all of 
the current state variables.   
Several observations about this form of solution can be noted.  First, by simple re-definition 
of variables it can be easily adapted to incorporate exponential time discounting, as economic 
applications typically employ.  Second, while the quadratic function has the convenience of yielding 
linear optimal control laws it implies that positive and negative deviations from targets are weighted 
equally, which may or may not be appropriate.  Third, if the time horizon is infinite and the matrices, 
,, , ABMN defining the optimal stabilization problems are constant over time, then the optimal 
policy summarized by (13) simplifies to the stationary rule  12  
    
1 ˆ() () ut N BP xt
− ′ =−        ( 1 4 a )  
where P  is the unique positive semi-definite solution to the matrix equation: 
   
1 0 M A P PA PBN B P
− ′′ ++ − =       (14b) 
By substitution it then follows from (13a), that when policy is set optimally, the economy evolves in 
accordance with 
    
1 () [ ]() x tA B N B P x t
− ′ =−        ( 1 5 )  
The policy rules (13a) [or (14a)] can be characterized as being a kind of “generalized 
proportional” policy of the type proposed by Phillips, in the sense that the current policy variables 
are related proportionately to the current state of the economy relative to its long-run target.  Unlike 
Phillips, the elements of the feedback rule, as described by (13a) or (14a), are given by specific 
values, which may be required to follow specific time paths, depending upon whether or not the 
economic structure is constant or time-varying.  By construction, (15) will ensure that the economy 
converges to its desired target value; problems of instability, which we saw could be associated with 
the inappropriate setting of the integral policy rule, do not arise. 
  One final point is that much of the interest in stabilization policy relates to stochastic 
systems.  Among the earliest treatments was Howrey (1967) who extended an earlier discrete-time 
multiplier-accelerator model formulated by Baumol (1961), to allow for additive stochastic 
disturbances.  But what if the parameters themselves in the basic structural equations such as (12a) 
are stochastic?  Important work by Wonham (1963, 1968, 1969) showed that the optimal policy rules 
of the form summarized by (13) and (14) above extend to this case, where the feedback rules are 
shown to depend upon the variance-covariance matrix of the underlying stochastic parameters.
12  
Early papers by Turnovsky (1973, 1976, 1977b) then applied these results to issues in 
macroeconomic stabilization policy, of the type pioneered by Phillips.   
                                                 
12 There are, however, constraints on the variance-covariance matrix of the underlying stochastic parameters which in 
effect assert that control is possible only if the stochastic components are not too large.  For a discussion of this 
stochastic stabilizability condition in the context of the conventional aggregate macroeconomic model, see Turnovsky 
(1977b).  13  
Recently, Kendrick (2005) has provided an excellent overview of the applications of 
stochastic control methods to the class of linear-quadratic economic models outlined in this section.  
With the introduction of stochastic elements, the availability of information at the time a policy must 
be implemented becomes important.  In particular, it becomes necessary to distinguish between 
open-loop control, when the entire time path for policy is solved at the outset, and feedback rules, 
when current policy is updated as new information becomes available.  In the case of deterministic 
systems which are fully known, the two solutions coincide.  There is no gain from feedback, 
although the open-loop solution can be expressed in feedback form as in (13), and as Phillips himself 
did.  An important aspect of this distinction involves learning, an issue to which we return in Section 
7.3 below. 
4.2  Some special cases 
  To give a sense of how these early applications of optimal stabilization policy relate to 
Phillips’ contributions, we consider several special cases.   
  First, suppose that the economy is purely one-dimensional, such as in equation (4) above, 
being expressed by 
     [ ] () () () y ts y t g t α =− +        ( 1 6 a )  
where ( ) y t  and  ( ) gt denote output and government expenditure, both measured about their 
respective target values, and  1 sc =− is the marginal propensity to save.  Investment is constant, 
equal to its desired value and there are no policy lags.  The policymaker’s objective is to choose the 





[( ) ( ) ]
2
Jm y t n g t d t
∞
≡+ ∫         (16b) 
subject to the evolution (16a).  The optimal policy for this problem is the linear feedback rule 
    () () gt p yt
n
α
=−         ( 1 7 a )   14  
where p is the positive solution to the quadratic equation 
   
2
2 20 ps p m
n
α
α +− =         (17b) 
The optimal policy summarized by (17) is a purely proportional one, as proposed by Phillips, though 
of the modified form (7a’) form.  In terms of his notation  0 p γ > , assuming the specific values 
implied by (17a), (17b), which in turn depend upon the underlying structural parameters. 
Turnovsky (1973) extended this to the case where s or α  were stochastic.  In the former 
case, for example, (17b) is modified to 
   
2
22 2 (2 ) 0 s ps p m
n
α
αα σ ++ − =       (17b) 
where  s , 
2
s σ  denote the mean and variance of the stochastic marginal propensity to save.  More 
stochastic variation in the savings propensity implies more intensive fiscal intervention. 
  More generally, suppose now that the economy is described by the following multiplier-
accelerator model, with all variables expressed in deviation form about their steady-state values 
    ( ) [ ( ) ( ) ] y tz t y t α =−          ( 1 8 a )  
    () () () () zt c yt it gt =+ +        (18b) 
   
()




ζν =−          ( 1 8 c )  
where ( ) zt  is aggregate demand and now investment,  ( ) it, is expressed as a lagged accelerator, 
where the desired stock of capital is proportional to output.
13  The system is now driven by two state 
variables, ( ), ( ) y ti t, and so optimal fiscal policy will be of the generic form 
     12 () () () gt yt it θ θ =+        ( 1 9 )  
where the feedback components,  12 , θ θ , are computed from (14a) and (14b) [see Turnovsky, 1973]. 
                                                 
13 Equation (18c) may be derived as follows.  Suppose the desired stock of capital is proportional to output, 
() ()
d kt v y t = , and that the actual capital stock adjusts gradually to its desired value in accordance with 
() [ () () ]
d kt k t kt ζ =−  .  Combining these two equations with the relationship  () () kt it =   yields (18c).   15  
Solving (18c), for  ( ) it and substituting, we can express (19) in the form 
   ()
2( )
12 2 () () ()
t ts gt v yt v yte d s
ζ θθ ζ θ ζ
−−
−∞ =+ − ∫      (19’) 
This can be seen to be the sum of Phillips’ proportional policy and a form of integral policy, where 
past outputs (or its deviations) have exponentially declining weights.  Furthermore, if the dynamics 
can be represented by a second order differential equation (as can easily be done in some variants of 
the Samuelson-Hicks model of the business cycle), the optimal policy can be written as the sum of a 
purely proportional plus a derivative component; see Turnovsky (1977a)   
  As a final example, we go beyond Phillips’ early work and introduce a form of the Phillips 
curve, augmented by “backward-looking expectations”.  Consider the simple monetary model: 
    () [() () ] yt zt yt α =−          ( 2 0 a )  
    12 () () [() () ] zt dyt d rt t π =− −        (20b) 
    () () () p ty tt κπ =+      0 κ >      ( 2 0 c )  
    () [ () () ] tp t t π ρπ =−       0 ρ >      (20d) 
For this modified structure, (20b) is an IS curve where aggregate demand positively upon output and 
negatively upon the real interest rate,  () () rt t π − .  Equation (20c) is an expectations-augmented 
Phillips curve, where the current rate of inflation,  () p t , increases with output expected inflation, 
where the coefficient on expected inflation,  () t π , is unity.
14  Inflationary expectations evolve in 
accordance with the backward-looking adaptive expectations scheme, (20d).  By substitution, this 
economy can be reduced to the pair of dynamic equations 
   () 12 () ( 1 ) () [() () ] yt d yt d rt t απ =−− −       ( 2 1 a )  
   () () ty t π ρκ =            (21b) 
                                                 
14 Much of the early empirical work on the Phillips curve was concerned with whether or not this coefficient is unity, an 
issue that has bearing on the existence or otherwise of a long-run unemployment-inflation tradeoff; see Turnovsky 
(1977a) for a discussion of this issue.  Despite this early debate, (20c) is a consensus canonical specification of the 
expectations-augmented Phillips curve.   16  
Assume that the policymaker sets the nominal interest rate,  ( ) rt, to minimize quadratic costs 
associated with deviations of output and inflation from their respective target values.  The optimal 
monetary policy will be of the generalized proportional form 
    12 () () () rt yt t ϕ ϕπ =+        ( 2 2 )  
which is essentially a form of the widely-discussed Taylor (1993) rule.
15 
Other examples can also be found, but we have surely made the point that the form of policy 
rules proposed by Phillips (1954) played a central role in the early applications of optimal control 
theory to stabilization policy. 
5.  The Challenge of Rational Expectations 
  The dynamic system considered by Phillips, as well as the early applications of dynamic 
control theory that we have been discussing, [including the last example of the expectations-
augmented Phillips curve] are of the classical type, in that all variables are assumed to evolve 
continuously from some given initial condition.  In the jargon of contemporary macrodynamics, all 
variables are “backward-looking” or “sluggish”.  This reflects the fact that economists were using 
the traditional techniques of differential equations as developed by applied mathematicians and 
control engineers, which of course was consistent with Phillips’ own academic background.  
  However, the development of rational expectations and its application to macrodynamics in 
the 1970’s introduced the notion that some economic variables, most notably financial variables, are 
“forward-looking”, incorporating agents’ expectations of the future.  It is realistic to permit these 
variables to respond instantaneously to new information as it impinges on the economy, instead of 
forcing them to evolve gradually from the past.  This was first illustrated in a simple monetary model 
by Sargent and Wallace (1973).  They showed how, given the inherent instability of the underlying 
differential equation driving the dynamics in this model, plausible economic behavior requires that 
the forward-looking variable (in their case the price level) to jump so as to ensure that the economy 
                                                 
15 Taylor rules are feedback rules that tie the current interest rate to deviations in expected inflation and output, about 
their desired target levels.  Taylor proposed the specific coefficients of 0.5 on the output variable and 1.5 on the inflation 
deviation.  Turnovsky (1981) has analyzed in detail the optimal tradeoffs between unemployment and inflation in an 
expanded version of this model.  17  
follows a bounded (stable) adjustment path.  Most economic dynamic systems consist of a 
combination of sluggish variables, such as physical capital, which by their nature can be 
accumulated only gradually, and forward looking jump variables, such as exchange rates or financial 
variables, that are not so constrained.  As a consequence, the standard dynamic macroeconomic 
system embodying rational expectations has a combination of stable and unstable dynamics, with the 
case of a unique convergent saddlepath arising when the number of unstable roots equals the number 
of jump variables; see Blanchard and Kahn (1980), Buiter (1984). 
  This represents a fundamentally different approach to macroeconomic dynamics from the 
earlier literature and the introduction of rational expectations has had a profound effect on the 
application of control methods to stabilization policy.  Several issues arise and we shall discuss these 
in turn. 
5.1  Computation of Optimal Policy Rules under Rational Expectations 
  The first issue is the task of solving for rational expectations equilibrium, even in the absence 
of any active stabilization policy.  While the equilibrium economic structure may be conceptually 
straightforward, its solution is likely to be computationally challenging, depending upon the dating 
of the forward-looking expectations variables, their forecast horizons, and the dimensionality of the 
system.  Solutions procedures have been proposed by several authors, including Blanchard and Kahn 
(1980), Fair and Taylor (1983), Buiter (1984), and more recently Sims (2001). 
  Currie and Levine (1985) provide a lucid description of the computation of optimal feedback 
rules for a continuous-time formulation containing both sluggish and forward-looking variables.   
They show how, in a system embodying rational expectations, one can partition the dynamic 
variables into predetermined (sluggish) variables and non-predetermined (forward-looking) 
variables, while taking account of the saddlepoint structure associated with the rational expectations 
equilibrium.  For the usual quadratic loss function, the resulting optimal policy rule can be expressed 
in several alternative but equivalent forms.  One form is as a linear function of both the 
predetermined and non-predetermined variables.  Alternatively, it can be expressed as a linear 
function of the pre-determined state variables and the pre-determined co-state variables (those  18  
associated with the non-predetermined variables).  However, since the latter can be expressed as an 
integral of the vector of the underlying state variables, the optimal policy rule can be expressed as a 
generalized linear feedback rule on the state variables combined with an integral feedback rule on 
the state variables.  To this extent the form of the Phillips’ policies still prevail.  Further details are 
provided in the Appendix.   
5.2 The  Lucas  Critique 
As we have been discussing, the objective of stabilization policy is to influence the time 
paths of a set of target variables, such as output, inflation, etc.  Being forward-looking, a key feature 
of rational expectations, in contrast to the traditional adaptive expectations scheme such as (20d), is 
that it incorporates the agent’s information regarding the structure of the economy.  In particular, 
rational expectations will include the agent’s perception of policy as part of the economic 
environment.  Lucas (1976) made the profound observation that, in these circumstances, for 
policymakers to conduct policy under the assumption that the coefficients describing the evolution 
of the economy remain fixed and invariant with respect to its chosen policy is not rational.  In the 
dynamic system, (8), for example, the behavioral parameters,  ,c α , will in general vary with the 
chosen policy parameter,  p γ .  This dependence needs to be taken into account in determining the 
effects of policy rules, as well as for the determination of optimal stabilization policy.
16   
The Lucas Critique is a general proposition having far-ranging implications for analyzing 
economic policy.  Its main message is that if we want to predict the effects of policy changes we 
must model the “underlying parameters” such as technology and preferences that govern individual 
behavior.  To the extent that modern macroeconomics is based on intertemporal optimization of 
utility subject to production constraints, the macroeconomic equilibrium so derived is immune from 
the Lucas Critique in that it is conditional on government policy.  We can then model policymaking 
as a game, whereby the government, acting as leader, makes its stabilization (policy) decisions 
                                                 
16 As a related observation, the Lucas Critique calls into question the practice of econometrically estimating the 
parameters of a reduced form equation such as (8).  This is because as the policy varies, so do the structural parameter, 
and consequently the assumption that they remain fixed over a sample period is inappropriate.  We should also note that 
the Lucas Critique does not apply to dynamic systems such as the original Phillips models, which are entirely backward-
looking.  19  
taking into account the reactions of the private sector.  This approach is at the core of the 
voluminous optimal tax literature. 
However, solving for optimal policy in this way may be difficult, particularly over time, and 
it furthermore, it may be unrealistic to assume that the policymaker knows precisely the private 
sector’s response to its decisions.  Amman and Kendrick (2003) propose an approximation based on 
the use of the Kalman filter.  The idea is that the policymaker need not be able to predict exactly 
how private agents will respond to its policies.  Rather, it can simply use the Kalman filter and 
update parameter estimates each period.  While this means that the policymaker will always be one 
period behind, in his perception of the private sector’s behavioral responses, they argue that this may 
be good enough for most applications of macroeconomic policy.  Monte Carlo runs they run provide 
some support this view. 
5.3 Policy  Neutrality 
  One area where the Lucas Critique is particularly potent is in the role of the Phillips curve in 
determining the tradeoffs between inflation and unemployment.  In this context the Lucas critique 
says that the nature of the tradeoff depends upon government policy.  The issue of policy neutrality 
is an extreme form of this, and asserts that, because of the Lucas Critique, the tradeoff breaks down 
completely.   
In an influential article, Sargent and Wallace (1976) provided an example to show that under 
rational expectations only unanticipated policy changes can have real effects, so that any feedback 
policy rule, such as the Phillips rules we have been discussing, will have no effect on output.  In our 
example, the time path of output would become independent of the policy parameters such as  p γ , so 
that there is no tradeoff between output and inflation.  It turns out that this policy neutrality 
proposition, as it is known, and which is potentially most damaging to the use of control theory as a 
tool of stabilization policy, is sensitive to model specification, and in particular to the timing of 
expectations.  This can be illustrated by comparing two simple examples. 
First, consider an economy represented by the pair of stochastic difference equations 
   [ ] 11 1 (() ( ) ) t t tt tt t ye r E PE Pu −+ − =− − − +     ( 2 3 a )   20  
   11 1 () tt t tt t t PP yEP P v θ −− − −=+ −+       (23b) 
where  t y  denotes output (in deviation form) in logarithms,  t P  denotes the price level in logarithms, 
1(.) t E −  denotes expectations, formed at time  1 t −  and assumed to be rational,  t r  is the nominal 
interest rate, and  , tt uv  are white noise random disturbances in demand and supply, respectively.  In 
keeping with the contemporary literature we employ discrete time.  Equation (23a) is a standard IS 
curve, relating output negatively to the real interest rate, where the expected rate of inflation over the 
period ( , 1) tt+  is based on information at time  1 t − .  The second equation is the New-Classical 
Phillips curve.
17  Assuming that the monetary authority treats the nominal interest rate  t r  as the 
policy variable, the equilibrium value of output  t y  can be shown to be 
    [ ] 1() tt t t t ye r E ru − =− − +          ( 2 4 )  
  The point about (24) is that (the deviation of) output depends only upon the unanticipated 
component of monetary policy.  Any feedback policy rule based on past observed data that the 
monetary authority follows is fully incorporated into private agents’ expectations and thus is fully 
negated in terms of its effects on current output. 
  Things change dramatically, however, if we now modify (23a) to  
   [ ] 1 (( ) ) tt t t t t ye r E PP u + =− − − +       ( 2 3 a ’ )  
The only difference is that we modify expected inflation for period ( , 1) tt+  to be conditional on 
information at time t, when the actual price level is observed.  The rational expectations solution for 
output under this seemingly modest reformulation is 
   [] [] 11
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In addition to the current unanticipated component of monetary policy, given by the first term of 
(24’), current output now depends upon the sum of all revisions to future monetary policy between 
                                                 
17 Lucas adopted what has become known as the “Lucas supply function”, which replaces (23b) by 
[ ] 1 () ( ) tt t y tP E P v λ − ′ =− + , so output deviations depend upon unanticipated price movements.  21  
time ( 1) t −  and t, which takes account of new information acquired at time t.  By impacting the 
forecast of inflation a feedback policy rule will now exert an impact on current output. 
  As a simple example, suppose that the monetary authority sets the interest rate in accordance 
with the rule 
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This is feedback rule whereby the monetary authority adjusts the interest rate in response to last 
period’s stochastic shocks, which are known at time t.  With  , tt uv  being white noise, taking 
expected values over relevant periods (24’) reduces to 
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which clearly is influenced by the policy rule.
18  Indeed, setting  1 e λ θ = +  succeeds in stabilizing 
output completely.  The presence of policy neutrality thus depends critically upon the available 
information, an issue that is taken up at greater length by Canzoneri, Henderson, and Rogoff (1983). 
5.4  Time Consistency of Optimal Policy 
  The fourth issue to arise when the system contains forward-looking jump variables is that of 
“time consistency”.  This concept was first introduced into the economics literature by Strotz (1955-
56).  It describes a situation where an agent’s preferences change over time, so that what is preferred 
at one instant of time is no longer preferred at some other later point in time.  This issue has 
ramifications for various aspects of economics and in particular for stabilization policy.  In this 
context the issue is whether or not a future policy decision that forms part of an optimal plan 
formulated at some initial date remains optimal when considered at some later date, even though no 
relevant information has changed in the meantime.  If it is not, the optimal plan is said to be time 
inconsistent.   
                                                 
18 We should point out that setting the nominal interest rate, as in this example, leads to an indeterminate price level, an 
issue that has generated some debate, particularly in the context of the so-called monetary instrument problem; see Poole 
(1970), Parkin (1978), Turnovsky (1980), and McCallum (1981).  This aspect does not invalidate the point we wish to 
make, and in any event can be easily rectified by introducing real money balances into the aggregate demand function.  22  
This problem was emphasized by Kydland and Prescott (1977) who argued that the problem 
of time inconsistency has grave implications for the application of control theory methods to 
problems of economic stabilization.  In the abstract to their paper they write “....We conclude that 
there is no way control theory can be made applicable to economic planning when expectations are 
rational.”  In the conclusions they argue “...active stabilization may very well be dangerous and it is 
best that it not be attempted.  Reliance on policies such as a constant growth in the money supply 
and constant tax rates constitute a safer course of action.”  These are strong statements and many 
people in the community of control theorists view this assessment of the role of control theory to 
stabilization policy as overly pessimistic. 
  But the question of time consistency (or inconsistency) is important, and attempts to resolve 
it have generated a lot of research.  The pursuit of time inconsistent policies will eventually cause the 
government to lose credibility and issues such as commitment and reputational equilibria have been 
analyzed by a number of authors; see e.g. Barro and Gordon (1983), Backus and Driffill (1985). 
One simple solution, very much within the spirit of the linear-quadratic framework, is the 
following.  As noted, the attainment of a rational expectations equilibrium involves an initial jump in 
the forward-looking variable.  These initial jumps presumably impose real dislocational costs on the 
economy, and these should be taken into account in the design of the optimal policy system.  Stemp 
and Turnovsky (1987) show how if these initial costs are large enough that it may cease to be 
optimal for the policymaker to re-optimize along a transitional path.   
  To see this assume that the policymaker’s objective function is to 
  Minimize 
22
0 0 [( 1 ) ] ( 0 )
q t ay a p e dt k P P
β ∞ − +− + − ∫  
This cost function now has two components.  The first is the standard quadratic loss function, 
asserting that the policymaker’s target is to achieve a zero rate of inflation ( 0 p = ) at a full 
employment level of output ( 0 y = ).  One objective is to minimize the discounted intertemporal 
deviations from these targets, with 01 a ≤ ≤  reflecting the relative importance assigned to these two 
objectives.   
  In a world of rational expectations, a change in monetary policy will cause an initial  23  
unanticipated discontinuous jump in the price level,  (0) P , from its previously inherited level,  0 P .  
Given sluggishness in the economy this causes jumps in real magnitudes, which impose structural 
adjustment costs [e.g. labor reallocation] on the economy and these should be taken into account in 
assessing the overall benefits of the optimal stabilization policy.  These initial adjustment costs are 
not reflected in the conventional term, but are incorporated in the second term.  Stemp and 
Turnovsky show that the time consistency or otherwise depends critically upon q, being time 
consistent if  1 q ≤  and time inconsistent otherwise.   
6.  Rules versus Optimal Policy 
  Despite the fact that the generic form of the optimal policy rule is the generalized 
proportional policy as set out in (13), from a practical point of view the policy may turn out to be 
extremely complicated to compute, especially for a large system, and even more so if it includes 
forward-looking variables.  This leads to the question of the gains from applying optimal control 
over using some simple, but reasonable, policy such as the three rules proposed by Phillips, or the 
Taylor rule, or perhaps even doing nothing at all. 
This is an old question, predating Phillips, going back to Friedman (1948) and early 
discussions of policy rules versus discretionary policy.  At that time Friedman advanced the 
proposition that due to the length and variability of lags in the effects of monetary policy, the 
monetary authority should abandon discretionary monetary management and simply should allow 
the money supply to grow at a fixed rate.  Indeed, our discussion of the Phillips rules provides some 
support for this view.  We have seen that the presence of policy lags can introduce unwanted cycles 
in the economy, and even instability that otherwise would not exist.  But the debate of rules versus 
discretion raises several issues, most important of which relate to the information that the 
policymaker possesses.  Here we briefly note some of them.   
First, suppose that the world is deterministic and the policymaker knows the true structure.  
Then by its nature the optimal policy dominates and so the question is whether the gains in economic 
stability are sufficient to justify the effort involved in computing the optimal rule over something 
much simpler and mechanistic.  Some years ago Feldstein and Stock (1994) addressed this question  24  
in an analysis where the objective is to target nominal income.  They reached the conclusion that 
there is little difference between a very simple adaptive rule and an optimal policy.  If this kind of 
proposition is robust, then simple policy rules of the type originally proposed by Phillips will 
continue to play an important role in the stabilization of dynamic economic systems. 
Second, what if there is uncertainty?  This introduces different levels of complications.  The 
optimal policy model introduced in Section 4 assumed that everything is known except for the fact 
that some of the parameters describing the economy are stochastic.  As we have seen this will 
influence the optimal setting of the associated policy instrument, just as it did in Brainard’s (1967) 
early analysis.  But one of the important results obtained by Wonham (1969) is that feedback control 
in a system with stochastic parameters, whereby the effects of policy become stochastic, is feasible if 
and only if the noise is not too great.  In this case, it is possible for the policy instrument used for 
stabilization to introduce too much noise into the system implying that the economy will actually be 
more stable if the policymaker does not intervene. 
Third, and most fundamentally, all optimal policies we derive are specific to an assumed 
economic structure, rather than the true economic environment that policymakers do not and cannot 
know.  What are the merits of employing the optimal policy to the wrong model, rather than some 
arbitrary alternative rule?  This issue is addressed in detail by Brock, Durlauf, Nason, and Rondina 
(2007).  Their approach is to construct a model space that includes all candidate models for the 
economy, evaluate the policies for each of the candidate models, and then determine how to draw 
policy inferences given the fact that the true model is unknown.  In contrast to the usual robustness 
analysis that measures misspecification relative to some baseline model, they acknowledge the 
global nature of model uncertainty.  They focus on the sensitivity of the rules to model uncertainty, 
rather than on the derivation of optimal rules in the presence of model uncertainty.  The other issue 
they address concerns the tradeoffs of policy on variances of different frequencies; policies that may 
reduce the variance of high frequency fluctuations may come at the expense of enhanced longer-term 
fluctuations. 
7. Recent  Developments  25  
  In this section we briefly note some of the more recent aspects of stabilization policy that 
pertain to Phillips’ contribution. 
7.1  New-Keynesian Phillips Curve 
  The New-Keynesian Phillips curve is based on a model of optimal pricing in imperfect 
competition and a theory of price stickiness; see e.g. Roberts (1995), McCallum and Nelson (1999), 
and Woodford (2003).  It is of the generic form 
    ( ) 11 () 0 1 tt t t t t PP y E P P θβ β −+ −=+ − < <      ( 2 5 )  
It differs from the New-Classical Phillips curve in that the expected inflation to which the current 
inflation is reacting extends for the next period ( , 1) tt+ , rather than for the previous period ( 1, ) tt − .  
This has important consequences for stabilization policy.  To see this, we shall combine (25) with 
(23a), for which the New-Classical Phillips curve yields policy neutrality.   
The form of the rational expectations solution depends upon the magnitude of  e β θ + .  We 
consider the case  1 e β θ +<  when the unique stable solution for  t y  is 
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It is clear that interest rate rules based on past information will influence current output.  For 
example, if  1 tt ru μ − = , then the solution to (26) is 
     1 tt t y eu u μ − =− +   
which is clearly dependent upon the policy parameter μ .  The case  1 e β θ + >  is associated with 
non-uniqueness issues of the type identified in rational expectations models by Taylor (1977),but 
depending upon how the non-uniqueness is resolved, policy rules will have real effects.  
7.2  Multi-agent Stabilization  
  Thus far we have focused on a single decision-maker, acting in isolation.  In reality, many 
economic situations are characterized by multiple decisionmakers operating in an interactive  26  
environment.  The decisions made by one agent influence the other, and vice versa, giving rise to 
strategic behavior that we can analyze as a dynamic game.  As is well known crucial factors 
determining the equilibrium outcome include (i) the availability of information at the time decisions 
are made, (ii) the sequencing of the decisions by the agents, and (iii) whether they behave non-
cooperatively to maximize their own individual welfare, or cooperatively to maximize their joint 
well-being. 
  Insofar as stabilization policy is concerned there are two main areas where strategic 
interaction is particularly important.  The first is the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy, 
allowing for the fact that the central bank may have different objectives from the Treasury.  This gets 
into issues relating to credibility of policy, reputation, and political aspects that are somewhat 
removed from the approach to stabilization that we are discussing here; see e.g. Persson and 
Tabellini (1999). 
  The second application is in the area of international economic policy coordination, and in 
particular monetary and exchange rate policy.  Miller and Salmon (1985) and Oudiz and Sachs 
(1985) have analyzed two country dynamic games of monetary policy, which are direct 
generalizations of the class of optimal policy model summarized in Section 4.  To give a flavor of 
this suppose the policy maker of Country 1 wishes to solve the following dynamic optimization 
problem 
   1 0 min ( ) ( ) wtQ w td t
∞
′ ∫  where  [] 12 () () () () wt xt ut u t′ ′ ≡     (27a) 
subject to the dynamic evolution 
   11 22 () () () () x tA x tB u tB u t =+ +         (27b) 
for given  (0) x .  Policy maker in Country 2 solves an analogous problem. 
As in previous examples the objective is to minimize a quadratic loss function, which 
depends upon Country 1’s controls,  1() ut, which of course this policymaker sets, Country 2’s 
controls,  2() ut, which he may react to, and a common set of target variables,  ( ) x t .  The latter may 
be more relevant to one country more than the other and may also include non-predetermined  27  
variables as well as pure state variables.  Equation (27b) describes the evolution of the state 
variables, which depend in part upon the choices each policymaker makes. 
For this setup Miller and Salmon discuss open loop and feedback Nash and Stackelberg 
solutions.  For feedback Nash, for example, each policymaker sets his controls in accordance with 
the feedback rule 
    1122 () () , () () ut R x t ut R x t ==       ( 2 8 )  
taking the other’s as given when making his decision.  The components of the feedback are 
determined by a generalized Riccati type equation which involves the structural parameters of both 
economies.  It will also depend upon the specific rule defining the dynamic game.  But the point we 
wish to make is that (28) are generalized proportional policy rules directly analogous to (14a) 
discussed earlier and hence the relationship to Phillips’ early work extends to this type of analysis.
19   
7.3 Utility  Maximization 
  The optimal stabilization rules we have derived have been chosen so as to minimize 
quadratic costs involving the deviations of the state variables and the control (policy) variables about 
some stationary level.  Many variants of this criterion can be found, varying in such aspects as to 
whether the deviations in output are measured relative to the full employment level, the frictionless 
level of output, etc.   
  Apart from the limitation noted earlier that the quadratic function is weighting positive and 
negative deviations equally, it suffers from the more serious criticism that it may or may not be an 
appropriate representation of welfare, which presumably is the issue of ultimate concern.  Indeed, for 
almost three decades now, the “representative agent model” has been the standard macroeconomics 
paradigm, although it too has been the source of criticisms.
20 With macroeconomic equilibrium 
being derived through utility maximization this framework is much more oriented toward analyzing 
welfare issues and therefore addressing issues pertaining to optimal policy making. 
                                                 
19 For an overview of the literature on linear quadratic differential games, see Engwerda (2005). 
20 See Colander (2006).  28  
  Recently, several authors have sought to examine the relationship between utility 
maximization and the conventional stabilization criteria that we have been adopting; see in particular 
Woodford (2003) where this is discussed in great detail.  There he establishes conditions under 
which the quadratic loss function, so widely employed in stabilization policy, can be viewed as a 
second-order approximation to the expected value of a more general utility function.  Here we 
informally sketch the relationship in a simple example. 
  Suppose welfare is represented by a utility function of the form  ( , ) Ucg, where c denotes 
consumption and g denotes government expenditure (the control variable).  Suppose further that 
through stabilization c and g are restricted to stochastic fluctuations about their respective mean 
levels ( , ) cg .  Employing a second order approximation to  ( , ) Ucg about ( , ) cg , and taking 
expected values, we may write 
 
22 11
( , )( , ) () () ( ) ( )
22
cc cg gg E Ucg Ucg U Ec c U Ec c g g U Eg g ≅+ − +− − + −         (29) 
Assume that output is produced by the production function  ( ) y fk = , where k denotes capital stock.  
If the agent maximizes intertemporal utility, it is well known that equilibrium consumption along an 
evolving stable adjustment path is of the form  ( , ) cc k g = , which may be linearly approximated by 
   ()() kg ccckk cgg −≅ − + −    
Substituting this linear approximation into (29) yields a second-order approximation to expected 
utility of the form 
(, ) (, ) EU c g U c g X ≅+   
where X is a quadratic loss term involving the state variable k and the control variable g.  For the 
simple production function, the state variable can be immediately transformed to y, as in the 
stabilization literature.  In order for the quadratic loss function to give the correct welfare rankings of 
different stabilization policies it must be the case that  ( , ) Ucg  is independent of policy, or at least is 
only weakly sensitive to it.  One case where it is independent is if the utility function is of the form 
() Uc g + .  With capital stock constant in steady state, product market equilibrium implies  29  
() cg f k +=   , where the steady-state stock of capital is fixed and determined by the marginal product 
condition ( ) fk ρ ′ =  , the rate of time discount. 
7.4 Learning 
Throughout this discussion we have assumed that the policymaker has complete knowledge 
of the true underlying economic structure.  In the case of deterministic systems all parameters are 
known, as is their evolution if they are time-varying.  In the case of stochastic systems all 
characteristics of relevant probability distributions are also known; only the specific random 
outcomes are unknown until they occur.  In reality, of course, policymakers do not know the true 
system.  Even if they know the broad structure of the economy, such as the general qualitative 
relationship among the variables, they will at best have only some estimate of the relevant 
parameters, and worse still, they are unlikely to even know the general structure of the economy, as 
Brock et al. (2007) have emphasized.  At best, policymakers and agents in general may learn about 
the structure of the economy as it evolves over time. 
The qualitative information about the economic structure becomes particularly important in 
dynamic models involving rational expectations, the key characteristic of which is that they 
incorporate agents’ perceived structure of the economy.  As a result of this, their beliefs about the 
economy will influence its actual evolution.  The fact that applications of rational expectations 
assume complete knowledge has been a source of its criticism.  While this is a reasonable objection, 
we view the traditional rational expectations specification as a useful benchmark, with its underlying 
characteristic of forward-looking behavior providing significant insights into macroeconomic 
dynamics in general and stabilization policy in particular. 
To incorporate learning is challenging and raises many issues.  By its nature, learning is a 
gradual process that takes place over time.  The interaction of the dynamics of this process with that 
of the system itself is important and not all learning processes need be stable.  The most 
comprehensive general study of learning as an element of macroeconomic dynamics is Evans and 
Honkapohja (2001) which itself draws heavily from their past research.   
They emphasize the method of expectational stability.  The key element of this concept is  30  
that it involves a mapping from the perceived law of motion (dynamic structure), which in general is 
incorrect, to the corresponding actual law of motion, which incorporates this incorrect information.  
If the system is expectationally stable, learning process for the unknown parameters will converge to 
the true values and the agent will ultimately learn the true economic process.  It is possible however, 
for the learning process to diverge, and cause the dynamics of the overall system to diverge as well. 
Several issues in this process arise and should be mentioned.  First, the time period involved 
in updating information on parameters need not coincide with the time interval that characterizes the 
system dynamics.  Second, it is possible for updating of information to involve nonlinear 
relationships, leading to a multiplicity of solutions, and for learning not converging to any of them; 
see Blanchard and Fischer (1989).  Third, information and learning is almost certainly not uniform 
across the economy; different agents have different degrees of information and different capacities to 
learn.  Evans and Honkapohja focus primarily on learning by private agents, but the same issues 
apply to policymakers engaged in optimal policy making.  Fourth, learning may take different forms, 
the two most common being least squares learning and Bayesian learning. 
The learning procedures we have been outlining can be characterized as being “passive”, in 
the sense that the agent learns about the relevant parameters over time as the system evolves and 
information is updated.  Kendrick (2005) contrasts this with “active” learning sometimes referred to 
as “dual control”.  In the stabilization policies we have been considering in previous sections, the 
policy instrument is used for a single purpose, namely to help move the economy toward its target.  
In contrast, in dual control the policy variable are used for two purposes.  In addition to the usual 
stabilization objective, the second is to perturb the system so as to enhance learning of the relevant 
parameters and thereby improve control performance at later stages.  This form of learning was 
introduced originally by Kendrick (1982) and later by Amman and Kendrick (1994), using 
techniques previously developed in the control literature by Tse and Bar-Shalom (1973). 
8. Conclusions 
  It is evident that Bill Phillips through his initial contributions to dynamic stabilization policy 
in conjunction with the Phillips curve has had a profound impact on the theory of economic policy.   31  
First, the policy rules he proposed frequently lie in the class of optimal policies and thus serve as a 
useful benchmark, thereby assisting in the interpretation of more complex optimal policy rules.   
Indeed the relationship of the Phillips policy rules to the optimal applies, not only to traditional 
optimal policy making based on sluggish backward looking systems, but it also applies to systems 
involving forward looking expectations, as well as multi-agent strategic policymaking problems. 
  The Phillips curve has been a remarkably resilient concept and has remained a key 
component of the output-inflation tradeoffs that characterize stabilization policy.  Beginning with 
original negative inflation-unemployment relationship, through the (backward-looking) 
expectations-augmented Phillips curve of the 1960s, to the New-classical Phillips curve of the 1970s 
and most recently the New Keynesian Phillips curves of the 1990s it has been a central component 
of short-run macrodynamic models for half a century.   
Indeed, the implementation of rational expectations presented a serious challenge to the use 
of control theory as an instrument of macroeconomic stabilization policy.  But it is fair to say that 
macroeconomists have accepted the challenge and that the methods of control theory are being 
applied more successfully than ever to dynamic macro models involving rational expectations.  The 
economics profession owes a great debt to Bill Phillips for introducing them to these analytical tools. 
 
Appendix 
Optimal stabilization rule when dynamics include both backward looking and forward-
looking variables 
In this Appendix we briefly provide the details in this case.  Our summary draws on the lucid 
exposition of Currie and Levine (1985).  Consider the optimal stabilization problem 
  
0 [' ' ] Min y My u Nu dt
∞
+ ∫        ( A . 1 a )  
subject to 
    yA yB w =+           ( A . 1 b )   32  
where  w is a vector of control variables and y, the vector of state variables are partitioned into pre-
determined variables, z, and non-predetermined variables, x, namely  [ ] y zx ′ ′ = .  There are p costate 
variables partitioned correspondingly,  12 [] p pp ′ ′ = .  For the predetermined variables,  0 (0) zz = , 
with  1(0) p  being free, while for the non-predetermined variables  2(0) 0 p =    
  The optimal rule for the deterministic control problem is of the form 
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and 
1 JB R B
− ′ =− , together with the transversality conditions lim ( ) ( ) 0
t ptyt
→∞ = , which in this case 
implies lim ( ) lim ( ) 0
tt pt yt
→∞ →∞ ==   If H has 2n distinct eigenvalues, n of these associated with the 
predetermined variables  2 [] ' zp  will be stable and n associated with the non-predetermined 
variables  1 [] ' x p  will be unstable.  Rearranging and partitioning (A.2b) accordingly, we may write 
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We form the matrix of left eigenvectors of H ,  Q say, and order it so that the first n rows are the 
eigenvectors associated with the n stable eigenvectors.  We then partition it so that 










Stability then imposes the relationship on the non-predetermined variables 
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The optimal feedback rule (A.2a) can thus be written  33  
  
1
11 12 2 2
2
()
() [ () () , () ]
()
zt
u t NB Rz t Rptpt D
p t
− ⎛⎞
′′ =− − − ≡ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
      (A.5)) 
where  [ ]
1
11 1 2 11 2 , DN B R B B R
− ≡− − −  and  [ ] 12 B BB ′ ≡ .  Thus we may write 










      ( A . 6 )  
the solution to which is 
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From (A.4) we see that 
    21 22 2 x Rz Rp =− −  
so that 
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